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Abstract  
Runway incursions pose a significant threat to 
continued safety in commercial aviation. In 
recent years, stakeholders have initiated a 
number of programmes dealing with the issue of 
runway incursions, with the majority adopting 
traditional advisory alerting techniques. In 
contrast, this work proposes the use of directive 
cockpit alerting, which provides both an alert of 
the conflict as well as guidance on which 
manoeuvre to conduct to clear the conflict. This 
paper reports the findings of simulator trails 
designed for the assessment of the effectiveness 
and acceptability of the directive alerting 
strategy within the context of runway 
incursions. Statistical analysis performed on the 
quantitative measures taken from the 
evaluations have shown that the directive mode 
of alerting leads to a higher probability of the 
crew performing the correct action when faced 
with an alert. This, together with overall 
participant acceptance of the directive alerting 
concept, is a strong indicator that the technique 
has the potential of providing a complete 
solution to the problem of runway incursions. 
1. Runway Conflict Alerting in the Cockpit  
Direct cockpit alerting of a conflict to the 
aircraft in take-off or landing is an improvement 
over the current operational standard. However, 
the method of situational awareness, based on 
cockpit displays and aural alerts of the presence 
of the conflict as described in literature [1-16], 
is not ideal. The take-off and landing phases of 
flight impose, in their own right, high workload 
and operational pressures to the crew. Bad 
weather conditions, pressures to adhere to tight 
operational schedules and busy airfields also 
contribute to heightened workload. 
Consequently, an alert would be triggered when 
the crew are busy performing other critical 
tasks. For instance during the take-off run, the 
crew are focused on monitoring their speed and 
engine parameters. Therefore, they cannot be 
expected to also monitor the traffic display to 
maintain their situational awareness of other 
aircraft close to the runway as backup, in the 
rare event that a runway conflict occurs. Such 
action could be more hazardous, by distracting 
the crew from their primary task. This problem 
is in fact more pronounced in systems 
exercising two levels of alerting (caution 
followed by warning). An early cautionary alert 
in landing, for instance due to a procedural 
conflict, could distract the crew from their 
landing procedure. Whilst the procedural 
conflict constitutes a threat, it does not 
necessarily lead to a physical conflict, since, 
although an obstructing aircraft on the runway 
violates procedure, this aircraft could be 
decelerating after landing with the intention of 
vacating the runway shortly. Subsequently, 
announcing an alert in the cockpit as a result of 
this type of conflict may potentially make the 
situation more hazardous, by unnecessarily 
alarming the crew in a delicate part of their 
landing sequence. 
 
When a runway conflict does occur, situations 
that may be hazardous to the safe continuation 
of the flight may develop very quickly and with 
little warning. This has shown to be the case in 
numerous runway conflict incidents and 
accidents, where a few seconds make the 
difference in the outcome of the scenario. In the 
typical conflict scenario of an aircraft 
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encroaching onto an active runway from a 
taxiway, it is only after the conflicting aircraft 
crosses the hold-short bar that a conflict could 
be flagged, leaving very little time from when 
the alert is generated to the collision. To 
aggravate matters, human reaction times and 
decision-making capabilities are severely 
compromised when workloads are high and 
when threatening situations are announced 
without prior warning. Additionally, crew are 
usually inexperienced in handling these 
situations, since most pilots are only faced with 
an event of a runway conflict during simulator 
trials and follow very little recurrent training on 
the subject. If a runway conflict is announced, 
the crew are faced with an uncommon situation 
and with very little time for corrective action to 
be taken; factors making for a deadly 
combination.  
 
Therefore there is the need for the design of a 
new alerting concept to address these issues. 
This is, however, challenging and requires 
careful consideration of several factors. 
Primarily, human interaction between the 
alerting system and the crew must be addressed, 
ensuring that the crew respond to the alert in the 
intended manner. Additionally, the operational 
environment has a large impact on the design of 
the alerting concept, with the high workload and 
time pressured events of take-off and landing 
adversely affecting the response of the crew to 
the alert. The physical environment of the 
cockpit also plays a significant role in the 
effectiveness of the alerting system, with some 
alerting technologies being more adequate than 
others in successfully interacting with the crew. 
Consequently this multidisciplinary problem 
requires an analysis of key aspects.  
1.1. The Mental Process in Runway 
Conflict Mitigation  
Following an alert of a conflict, crew are 
required to mentally follow the information 
processing procedure [17] and effectively take 
the following steps in order to successfully 
resolve the conflict: 
• Perceive the threat, 
• understand the dynamics of the situation, 
• determine a manoeuvre that will 
successfully resolve the conflict, 
• decide to execute the manoeuvre, 
• execute the manoeuvre. 
•  
Performing these steps can take several seconds 
and need to be performed in an environment 
where time is of the essence in determining 
whether the conflict can be successfully 
resolved or not. Additionally, once the threat is 
understood by the crew, it may be very difficult 
for them to reliably and objectively determine 
what action to perform to mitigate the conflict. 
The mode of information transfer is also critical 
to this step, as it has the potential of introducing 
additional delays. For instance, for a conflict 
occurring during take-off, it may not be possible 
for the crew to identify very quickly from a 
graphical display (particularly in critical 
circumstances) whether it is better to abort the 
run and to stop before the conflict, or to 
continue the take-off and overfly it safely. In 
fact, crews only have their intuition and 
experience to go by in measuring the distance 
required to safely stop their aircraft or complete 
the run and become airborne. Considering the 
fact that crew typically operate different aircraft 
and in a large variety of operating conditions, it 
is impossible to objectively determine it 
mentally with confidence. Additionally, in the 
operational environment of take-off and 
landing, deciding to perform a manoeuvre can 
be demanding and is subject to hesitation or 
even erroneous conclusions. Studies have 
shown that whereas in clear-cut conditions a 
decision can be taken quickly, in marginal 
conditions humans tend to dither. Hesitation, in 
this circumstance, results in the changing of the 
situation that may no longer render the original 
decision on what manoeuvre to perform valid. 
   
Therefore, the method of providing an 
informative (advisory)1 alert of a conflict that 
requires the pilot to carry out the five previously 
mentioned steps could result in the conflict not 
being adequately resolved. The use of aural 
                                                
1 Although the alert is advisory in nature, the term 
informative is used herein to distinguish it from advisory, 
the latter often used to signify an alerting level. 
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informative alerts alone would take too long to 
convey the complex spatial and temporal 
information on the existence and position of the 
conflicting aircraft. Additionally, it is 
impractical for an aural informative alert to 
provide an indication of possible avoidance 
manoeuvres. On the other hand, the use of 
graphical information alone, through the use of, 
for instance, a moving-map, requires the crew to 
continuously monitor the display for the event 
that a rare runway conflict occurs, distracting 
them from other more routine tasks. If, 
however, such monitoring is not performed, 
conflicts may be missed (i.e. step 1 in the chain 
is missed). This could be mitigated through the 
use of an aural and/or visual attention grabber, 
to attract the crew's attention of the conflict. 
Following this, the crew could then make use of 
the display to continue the information 
processing procedure. However, this technique 
has the potential of introducing a delay 
associated with looking at the display and 
understanding what the problem really is, 
particularly when considering the complexity of 
a moving-map display with traffic overlay. In 
the context where crew cannot constantly look 
at a graphical display, the attention grabber 
would be the first indication of the conflict and 
the crew would therefore be unaware of its 
presence and threat, leading to a slow reaction. 
On the other hand, if the crew have a 
preconceived perception of the potential threat, 
through for instance having seen an aircraft 
approaching the runway visually, then, when the 
alert is triggered the pilot may inadvertently 
latch onto the wrong target on the display, 
where in actual fact the alert of incursion would 
be caused by another aircraft. These 
shortcomings may therefore suggest that the use 
of a moving-map for this application may be 
inappropriate.  
  
In order to support a fast, reliable and repeatable 
crew response to a runway conflict, it would be 
advantageous to automate the first three steps in 
the chain. This will result in the crew mentally 
following a shorter route in the information 
processing procedure as shown in Figure 1, 
thereby eliminating the time required to assess 
the situation and take a decision. This approach 
also reduces the variability in the crew's 
response as a result of personal perception and 
rushed decisions, which potentially can be a 
significant improvement when considering the 
human (pilot) in the response chain. 
 
Figure 1 - Reducing reaction time delay through the 
bypass of processes in the human information processing 
chain. Adapted from [17]. 
 
1.2. Top Level Design Requirements 
 
Following on these arguments, four design 
requirements were identified for a new alerting 
concept, namely: 
1. The new alerting system shall integrate and 
harmonise with existing systems and 
operating procedures (SOPs) such that it 
does not detract the flight crew's attention 
from existing systems.  
2. The alerts shall provide sufficient and non-
resource-conflicting information such that 
the crew response occurs in a timely 
manner.  
3. The alerts shall be clear such that they 
generate an immediate and correct action on 
behalf of the crew. 
4. The new alerting system should make use of 
multiple channels to benefit from 
redundancy gains.     
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2. Proposed Alerting Technique  
2.1. Conflict Alerting during Take-off and 
Landing  
With the requirement for the new alerting 
system to provide the crew with directive aural 
alerts to instruct them on what action to take, a 
new alerting scheme has been developed to 
provide short, clear messages in the cockpit. 
Since the alerting system is designed to operate 
as a safety-net function, the alerts are generated 
only when traditional separation assurance 
methods fail. By definition, alerts generated by 
such a system are tactical in nature and require 
immediate crew attention and action. As a 
result, the context warrants that alerts are 
generated only at level 3 (warning), as level 2 
(caution) and level 1 (advisory) alerts would 
constitute nuisance alerts during take-off and 
landing that can unnecessarily distract the crew 
from their primary tasks and could lead to 
unnecessary action. 
 
Runway conflicts occurring during take-off can 
be mitigated in one of two ways; either by 
aborting the run and bringing the aircraft to a 
stop on the runway, or otherwise, continuing 
with the take-off and climbing over the 
conflicting aircraft. During landing, conflicts 
can be mitigated by either missing the approach 
and conducting a go-around, or otherwise, in the 
event that the conflict will resolve itself as the 
ownship approaches the runway, the aircraft can 
be allowed to continue with the landing.  
Determining which of the manoeuvres can be 
conducted safely requires an assessment of the 
aircraft’s take-off and landing performance. 
 
Therefore, in both take-off and landing, the pilot 
needs to be told to either abort the manoeuvre 
(rejected take-off (RTO) or go-around 
respectively), or otherwise continue with the 
manoeuvre. In the latter case, although a runway 
conflict has occurred, no action is required from 
the crew. Consequently, to remain in line with 
the ‘Dark-and-Silent’ cockpit philosophy, in 
which an alert should only represent a failure 
condition, the alerting system should remain 
quiet. For the aborted manoeuvre case, the 
wording ‘STOP’1 and ‘GO-AROUND’ are 
already used as formal phraseology in the 
cockpit to indicate an aborted take-off and 
missed approach respectively. Therefore, it is 
natural for these words to be adopted for the 
new alerting scheme. However, these words 
alone give no indication to the crew on the 
reason for the stop or go-around to be initiated 
and may be detrimental to the pilot's mental 
process of obeying the alert. Therefore, these 
have been appended with the word ‘TRAFFIC’, 
to indicate that the alert is being issued due to a 
traffic conflict, so that the overall adopted 
phraseology becomes ‘STOP TRAFFIC’ and 
‘GO-AROUND TRAFFIC’.  
 
Since the cockpit environment could be noisy, 
the sounding of an alerting tone prior to the 
verbal alert has been be introduced to act as an 
attention grabber, reducing the problem of 
detectability. The alerting tone being proposed, 
described textually as ‘WHOOP WHOOP’, is 
similar in concept to that currently used for 
EGPWS alerts and is approximately 1s long. 
The full aural alert, is repeated periodically until 
mitigating action has been taken. The alerts are 
repeated with a 2.5s interval, allowing sufficient 
time for crew reaction whilst avoiding the 
problem of alert overload due to rapid 
repetition.  
 
In the case of a rejected take-off, crew may still 
be unaware of how far the conflicting aircraft is, 
particularly in low visibility. Therefore, the 
alerting system has been designed to take up the 
resolution assessor role by providing the crew 
with distance-to-conflict call-outs in metres2. 
These are useful as they provide an indication of 
deceleration and closure rate and could be used 
by the crew in the event of an imminent 
collision, for taking the decision on whether or 
not to take unconventional action, such as a 
lateral excursion, to avoid the collision.  
 
                                                
1 The phraseology ‘ABORT’ is also used by various 
operators. The exact wording of the alert itself is not 
critical to the scope of the study and could be adapted to 
suite manufacturer and operator convention. 
2 Distance call-outs may alternatively be made in feet, 
depending on airframer convention. 
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Once the conflict has been cleared, either 
through action on behalf of the crew in 
following the alert or through action on behalf 
of the other aircraft, an advisory alert to indicate 
that the critical situation has ended is given. In 
this case, a ‘CLEAR OF CONFLICT’ alert is 
issued, in line with the phraseology already used 
by TCAS.    
 
The aural alert is also supported by a textual 
alert on the primary flight display. This takes 
advantage of redundancy gains by providing the 
alert through both the aural and visual channels.   
2.2. Conflict Alerting during Taxi, 
Backtrack and Line-up 
When the ownship is taxiing, backtracking or 
lining up for take-off on the runway, it could 
cause a runway conflict by incorrectly being on 
the runway whilst another aircraft is attempting 
to take-off or land. Since the ownship would 
probably be manoeuvring slowly or would be 
stationary, there are several situations where 
mitigating action on behalf of the third party is 
required to clear the conflict.  In these cases, 
therefore, the crew cannot be directed into 
taking any evasive manoeuvre. Although these 
situations are not the direct focus of this work, 
they are being considered herein to be able to 
provide a complete alerting solution whilst the 
ownship is manoeuvring on the runway.  
  
Since directive alerting is not possible in these 
cases, the use of informative alerts in 
conjunction with a moving-map display is being 
proposed. These are useful in enhancing the 
crew's situational awareness by making them 
aware about the situation and also prompting 
them to communicate the situation to ATC and 
take mitigating action when possible. 
 
In the event of a traffic conflict during line-up 
(i.e. when the aircraft is stationary), a 
‘CAUTION TRAFFIC’ alert is being proposed. 
In this case a cautionary alert, rather than a 
warning, is warranted since the ownship is 
stationary and is typically not in a position to 
take any evasive action. This phraseology alone, 
however, provides little information on the 
location of the other aircraft. Consequently, the 
terms ‘BEHIND’ and ‘AHEAD’ appended to 
the alert are being proposed, as these give an 
indication on the whereabouts of the other 
aircraft and provide added situational awareness 
to the crew. On the occurrence of such an event, 
the procedure will require the pilot in command 
to refer to the moving-map display, on which an 
auto pop-up showing the conflict would be 
displayed. The crew would then decide on any 
appropriate action that is to be taken.  
 
In the event of a traffic conflict during taxiing or 
backtrack, a ‘WARNING TRAFFIC 
AHEAD/BEHIND’ alert is being proposed, 
since mitigating action by the ownship could 
indeed be possible in certain circumstances, by 
vacating the runway through the closest 
taxiway.  
 
3. Evaluation of the Alerting Philosophy 
In order as to evaluate the efficacy of the 
directive alerting philosophy, a series of 
simulator evaluations were carried out to qualify 
the alerting system to a Technology Readiness 
Level (TRL) of 4. The objectives of the 
evaluations were to: 
• Assess the effectiveness and acceptability of 
the aural directive alert on the flight deck. 
• Assess how well the system leads the crew 
to the correct (directed) response and to 
understand why crews reacted in the manner 
they did in the scenarios given. 
• Assess the value of the preceding auditory 
tone and the use of a graphical display in 
conjunction with the aural alerts. 
• Compare the directive aural alert philosophy 
with a typical advisory (or informative) 
mode of alerting. 
3.1. Independent Variables 
Since the directive alerting philosophy for 
runway conflicts is novel and its implications 
may be controversial in comparison with more 
traditional HMI strategies, there was an interest 
in comparing crew reaction to the directive and 
advisory (traditional) alert techniques. To 
A. SAMMUT, D. ZAMMIT MANGION 
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achieve this, the alerting unit was modified to 
support three HMI output modes, namely: 
 
Mode 1: Directive alerts with introductory tone. 
No traffic information available on the 
navigation display. 
 
Mode 2: Directive alerting as in Mode 1 with 
introductory tone removed. Traffic information 
shown on a typical airport moving-map and a 
textual graphical alert to annunciate the directed 
manoeuvre.  
 
Mode 3: Advisory alerting. The directive alerts 
were replaced by informative verbal alert 
‘RUNWAY INCURSION’ without the 
introductory tone. Traffic information shown on 
a typical moving-map as in Mode 2. 
 
The aim was to have participants complete the 
evaluation scenarios using one of the three 
modes. This alone, however, would not give 
each individual participant exposure to the 
various modes and therefore no direct 
comparison of which alerting technique is 
preferred could be obtained. Seen in isolation, 
either mode of alerting could be seen as an 
improvement over no alerting system. 
Therefore, midway during the trials, some 
participants were presented with scenarios in 
both Mode 2 and Mode 3. This allowed for 
qualitative comparison of the modes and 
instigated comments, criticism and 
recommendations. To compensate for the effect 
of preconditioning, some participants were 
presented with Mode 2 followed by Mode 3, 
whilst others were presented with Mode 3 
followed by Mode 2.  
3.2. Scenario Design 
A total of 15 scenarios were designed to test the 
alerting system. These were chosen to simulate 
runway incursions during the take-off (including 
line-up), landing and taxi or backtrack on the 
runway, with seven scenarios involving 
conflicts during take-off, six during landing and 
two with the ownship in taxi or stationary on the 
runway. 
 
Two aircraft were involved in each scenario: the 
ownship and the intruder. The ownship was the 
aircraft represented by the actual simulator 
equipped with the alerting system whilst the 
intruder was the aircraft coming in conflict with 
the ownship on the runway, typically causing a 
runway incursion by violating ATC instructions. 
Other aircraft movements were also simulated 
but only one intruder was selected during the 
scenarios. This assumption is valid due to the 
fact that it is highly improbable for more than 
one aircraft to be in runway conflict with the 
ownship at one time. 
 
Due to the synthetic environment of the 
simulator, where the occurrence of a collision is 
harmless and the fact that the crew participating 
in the evaluations are preconditioned to expect a 
conflict to occur, generating realism is 
challenging. This is a similar problem to that 
encountered during line pilot proficiency 
checks, where pilots expect engine failures and 
pilot incapacitation during take-off. They are 
therefore more likely to successfully react to the 
failure, as the element of surprise is lost. To 
compensate for this problem, crew workload 
during take-off or landing was elevated to a 
higher level than that expected during normal 
operations. This was achieved by asking the 
participants to manually fly the aircraft (without 
the aid of the auto-pilot), as well as by adding 
moderate crosswinds and turbulence. With 
crews typically intent on flying the aircraft and 
landing properly, the increased workload was 
designed to distract the crew from the awareness 
of the test set-up and the expectancy of an alert. 
This strategy was found to be effective, to the 
extent that in one circumstance the pilot flying 
was so focussed on flying the aircraft that he 
missed one of the runway conflict alerts issued 
during landing, despite the loudness of the alert. 
 
The majority of the scenarios (11 of 15) where 
set in low visibility. Although also useful in 
good visibility, it is expected that the alerting 
system will be most effective in low visibility 
conditions (and in the dark), where the crew 
would be otherwise unaware of the traffic 
conflict situation that would be developing and 
an alert would come as a surprise. Low visibility 
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conditions simulate the situation where the crew 
are unaware about the runway conflict well, 
therefore ensuring the element of surprise.  
The remaining four scenarios were set in good 
visibility to allow the assessment of the crew's 
reaction to a directive alert when they have 
visual means to independently confirm the 
conflict situation. The scenarios were set in 
marginal conditions so that feedback on whether 
crews were inclined to overrule the aural 
directive alerts as a result of their independently 
formed understanding of the conflict scenario, 
or otherwise, could be obtained. Such scenarios 
can be considered to assess the limits of 
performance of the directive alerting strategy 
and were designed to provide valuable 
information on the crew's perception of and 
reliance on the alerting strategy.   
3.2.1. The Scenarios 
Scenarios 1 and 2 were designed to address 
taxiing and line-up manoeuvres on the runway. 
Although not the main focus of the evaluations, 
these scenarios were included to stimulate 
discussion on and support the investigation of 
the value of the alerting system in these 
situations.  Scenario 1 was designed to simulate 
two aircraft backtracking after each other in 
very low visibility of 100m1 with the ownship 
being the second aircraft slowly closing in on 
the aircraft ahead. The scope of the scenario is 
that of evaluating the crew's cautiousness to 
proceed in the situation and to identify whether 
the use of an alert to indicate a violation of 
minimum separation would be beneficial or a 
nuisance. The value of the moving-map display 
in such circumstances, when made available, 
was also assessed.  
 
Scenario 2 was designed to simulate the 
situation where the ownship is lined up for take-
off with another aircraft on final approach for 
landing on the same runway. This scenario was 
intended to depict the difficult situation where, 
                                                
1 Despite the fact that crew would typically not accept 
such a manoeuvre in such low visibility, the scenario is 
useful in evaluating the appropriateness of the alert. In 
these scenarios, participants were asked to taxi faster than 
they would normally feel comfortable with. 
in an environment where the ownship is the 
only aircraft equipped with the alerting system, 
a runway conflict occurring when the ownship 
is in a low energy state cannot easily be 
mitigated by ownship action alone. The scenario 
was intended to generate discussion on what 
sort of action the crew would feel comfortable 
in taking in such situations and whether the 
aural alert and graphical display are appropriate.    
      
Scenarios 3 to 9 were designed to simulate 
conflicts during take-off, with conflicts 
occurring at different speeds ranging from the 
start of take-off to the decision speed V1. Such a 
wide range was selected because the 
implications of aborting the manoeuvre vary 
significantly as the take-off manoeuvre 
progresses towards V1 and this often results in 
preconditioned mind-sets that influence the 
crew's decision in such circumstances. 
Consequently, it was desirable to consider the 
effect of take-off progress on the pilot's 
reactions to the alerts. Scenario 3 was set with 
the conflicting aircraft already present on the 
runway, 400m ahead of the ownship, when the 
ownship commences the run, giving a time-to-
latest-reaction (TTLR) of approximately 6s. 
Scenarios 4, 5, 6 and 7 were intended to 
generate alerts in the low-speed, medium-speed 
and high-speed regime. In these scenarios, the 
conflicting aircraft was made to enter the 
runway at distances of 400m, 800m, 1000m and 
2000m from the runway threshold respectively, 
with a TTLR set at 3s. This corresponds to the 
conflicts being generated when the ownship is at 
approximately 40kts, 60kts, 80kts and 120kts 
respectively. The precise speed per run at which 
the alert is generated depends on the actual 
aircraft acceleration profile which is run-
dependent (according to specific pilot handling). 
This, however, does not affect the scenario 
repeatability, as what needs to be repeatable is 
the TTLR for a particular speed regime. All the 
scenarios were set in low visibility so that the 
conflicting aircraft would not be visible before 
the alert was issued. In these scenarios, 
performing a RTO is the only correct 
manoeuvre and therefore an alert to abort the 
run is issued. Following the abort, the crew are 
presented with the distance-to-conflict 
A. SAMMUT, D. ZAMMIT MANGION 
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countdowns. Comparison of crew response in 
these scenarios enables the assessment of a 
number of issues such as, for example, whether 
there would be a tendency for crews to hesitate 
aborting at higher speeds and whether following 
a high speed rejection, there was any tendency 
to decrease braking if crews perceived that the 
aircraft was decelerating fast enough to stop 
before reaching the conflicting aircraft. 
 
Scenario 8 was one of the good visibility 
scenarios designed to evaluate the crew's 
confidence in the system when independent 
conflict situational awareness can be obtained 
through visual contact. This scenario consisted 
of an intruding aircraft approaching the runway 
from a taxiway which, however, only crosses 
the runway after the ownship in take-off crosses 
the intersection point. Of course, the crew (and 
alerting system) would have detected the 
aircraft proceeding beyond the hold-short bar 
and approaching the runway, but the set-up 
allowed the ownship to pass the taxiway 
intersection point just as the intruder would be 
approaching the runway shoulder. In this case, 
therefore, the alerting system would not 
generate an alert, as the preferred option would 
be to continue the run. Indeed, the scenario was 
set such that aborting the run would allow more 
time until the ownship reaches the intersection 
point, thereby increasing the risk of collision as 
the intruder would proceed further forwards and 
eventually enter the runway. Visually, however, 
it would not be so easy to come to this correct 
conclusion, potentially concluding that it is 
better to stop. This scenario, therefore, offered 
an excellent opportunity to assess the 
confidence the crew can be expected to have in 
the system and how the two independent 
channels, namely that of the aural alert and the 
visual channel providing external cues, interact.  
 
Scenario 9 was again designed to test the 
assertiveness of the alerting philosophy when 
visual impressions can conflict with the 
system’s intentions. In this case, the condition 
was set-up to test the assertiveness in the silent 
cockpit philosophy in continuing a take-off run. 
To this effect, the conflict conditions were 
designed so that an intruder causes a conflict at 
135kts (just before V1) such that the dynamics 
result in a can-go/cannot-stop condition. 
Accordingly, the system remains silent and no 
alert is generated. The velocity was set such that 
the intruder became visible in the reduced 
visibility conditions after the system detected 
the conflict, but just before or about V1. In this 
way crew would become aware of the conflict at 
a critical time in a silent environment and the 
element of surprise would be significant. This 
scenario was particularly interesting as it also 
allowed the assessment of whether the lack of 
any call-out could be interpreted as a system 
failure. 
  
Scenarios 10 to 15 addressed conflicts during 
landing. Here, three scenarios were designed to 
occur in good visibility (11, 13 and 14) in order 
to allow crews to form an independent opinion 
of the developing situation. In Scenario 10, the 
conflicting aircraft was lined-up for take-off on 
the same runway on which the ownship would 
be landing. In this case, the system remained 
silent until 15s to collision. With the ownship 
travelling at approximately 150kts, this 
corresponded to the alert being generated when 
the ownship would be approximately 1100m 
from the threshold. In this scenario, therefore, it 
was expected that crews would detect the 
conflict before the alert to go-around would be 
generated by the system and the intention was to 
assess whether crews tolerated the other aircraft 
on the runway and proceeded with the approach 
until the system issued the alert or whether they 
would initiate the missed approach earlier on 
their own initiative. In this way, the scenario 
supported the assessment of the appropriateness 
of the alerting threshold (i.e. the timeliness of 
the alert) and whether the silent behaviour of the 
system before the alert was triggered, caused 
any concern that the system had failed (thereby 
reducing the confidence in the system). 
 
Scenario 11 was designed with the ownship 
number two in the landing sequence and the 
aircraft fails to vacate the runway. An alert to 
go-around is issued when the ownship comes 
within 10s of the runway threshold. With the 
conflict occurring in good visibility and the 
crew being in visual contact with the other 
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aircraft, the scenario is intended to instigate 
discussion on the timeliness of the alert. 
Specifically, it was of interest to assess whether 
the alert comes too early and is of nuisance or 
whether the alert comes too late, making the 
crew feel uncomfortable with the situation and 
would prefer calling the go-around earlier. In 
the case where the alert is considered to be 
issued too early, it was relevant to assess 
whether the crew were ready to overrule the 
alert and knowingly continue the descent.  
 
Scenario 12 was simulated in low visibility, 
with the conflicting aircraft entering laterally 
into the runway from a taxiway 800m from the 
threshold when the ownship would be 10s 
(750m) from touchdown. An alert is triggered 
immediately to instruct the crew to go-around. 
This scenario was designed with the intention of 
monitoring the crew's reaction to a go-around 
during the last seconds before touchdown.  
 
Scenario 13 addresses the situation where the 
ownship is on final approach to land on a 
runway operated in mixed mode with an aircraft 
taking off ahead of it. The aircraft commences 
take-off and aborts the run. This scenario was 
set in good visibility so that the crew will be 
able to see the other aircraft stationary in the 
middle of the runway. The scenario is set so that 
the alert to go-around is once again triggered 
when the ownship is approximately 10s from 
the runway threshold. The scope of this scenario 
was as in Scenario 11, to evaluate the timeliness 
of the alert in the context.  
 
Scenario 14 is similar to Scenario 11, but the 
aircraft just landed ahead will start to turn off to 
vacate the runway just before an alert on the 
ownship would be triggered. This scenario was 
designed to test the appropriateness of the 
alerting threshold in such circumstances. The 
scenario was set in good visibility to enable 
crew to be in visual contact with the aircraft 
ahead. This scenario also tested the crew’s 
confidence in the silent concept (i.e. whether 
they would doubt system failure) and allows 
corroboration of views with those obtained from 
Scenario 8 in take-off.    
 
The last scenario, Scenario 15, addresses a 
conflict scenario occurring after the ownship 
will have touched down on landing. In this case, 
there will be little action the crew can take other 
than from applying maximum braking and full 
reverse thrust. In this scenario an alert is issued 
to direct the crew to apply maximum braking. 
As in the case of take-off, the distance call-outs 
are intended to provide situational awareness 
with respect to distance to the conflict and 
closure rates to the crew. In this scenario it was 
interesting to evaluate how the crew would react 
to the alert generated after touchdown as well as 
evaluate whether, in the case they would not be 
able to decelerate in time, the crew would 
consider a lateral manoeuvre.   
 
3.3. The Participants 
The crews chosen to participate held a full, 
fixed-wing, single-aisle, multi-engine rating 
with a range of experience, ranging from junior 
first officers to senior captains and training 
captains. Ages ranged from the mid-twenties to 
the mid-fifties, with a total flying experience 
ranging from 1,300 to 17,500 hours. Four 
participants had a B737 type rating with the 
remaining being current on the A320. Hours on 
type ranged from 1,000 to 11,500 hours. Most 
of the participants who flew the A320 had 
previously also flown the B737 (200 and/or 
300/400 series aircraft) and some also flew the 
Avro RJ70. Such a wide sample range provided 
a representative sample of the whole population 
in terms of considerations such as age group, 
experience and training background. The 
sample, however was, due to the resources 
available, limited in terms of aircraft category 
(no pilots flew long range/twin-isle aircraft, 
small commuter aircraft or business jets) and 
airline culture. Nevertheless the sample chosen 
was not considered to distract from the scope of 
the evaluations. The mixture of experience 
between B737 and A320 aircraft is of relevance 
when considering HMI strategies, since the two 
airframers (Boeing and Airbus) tend to have 
somewhat divergent strategies in cockpit 
philosophies.  
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Twenty-three individuals were chosen on the 
basis of non-probabilistic convenience 
sampling1. The majority (91%) were male and 
9% (two participants) were female. During the 
evaluations, participants were asked to follow 
typical company procedures, operating in crew 
of two in order to ensure representative 
operation (ecological validity). The more senior 
member was asked to act as the pilot in 
command.  
3.4. Data Collection 
Both qualitative and quantitative data were 
collected in the evaluations, with the former 
expected to capture the most indicative of 
results. Qualitative data were obtained from 
post-scenario questionnaires and semi-
structured interviews to establish the 
participants' overall acceptance of the alerting 
system and the clarity of the alerts generated. 
Quantitative data were obtained through logging 
of flight simulator data, which, following 
processing were used to compare the efficiency 
of the evasive manoeuvre executed by 
participants.  
3.5. Evaluation Results and Analysis 
Twenty-two evaluation sessions using crew 
pairs were carried out for a total of 175 trials 
(scenario runs), with 76 in HMI Mode 1, 63 in 
Mode 2 and 36 in Mode 3. The scenarios 
selected for evaluating the HMI in Mode 3 
(informative alerting) were mostly high-speed 
take-off scenarios and those during landing 
where a missed-approach could be avoided, as it 
is in these circumstances where the comparison 
between directive and informative alerting was 
expected to be most crucial.  
 
3.5.1. Objectives 1 and 2  
                                                
1 Subjects were selected because of their convenient 
accessibility with respect to location, availability and cost. 
Since the evaluations where held over a two-month 
period, the effect of convenience sampling due to crew 
schedules was not expected to have any impact on the 
validity of the evaluations and extrapolation of the results 
to the whole population. 
Although objectives 1 and 2 are distinct, their 
discussion is linked and they are consequently 
herein presented together.  
 
All participants accepted the directive alerting 
concept and considered it an improvement when 
compared to the current operational 
environment. Likewise, all participants reported 
that the alerts were unambiguous and easy to 
understand, as the phraseology used was in line 
with phraseology currently used on the flight 
deck. Crews had no problem following the 
command to either abort the run during take-off 
or to perform a missed approach during landing. 
This, however, may not be surprising, as crew 
are typically accustomed to following 
commands. All of the participants felt that the 
directive nature of the alerts is in line with the 
philosophy employed in the cockpit, where 
currently a TCAS or EGPWS alert directs the 
crew into taking a manoeuvre. For this reason, 
the crew felt comfortable in following the alerts 
(T1.1-T1.3). Typical comments, which also 
relate the level of confidence expressed in the 
system, were:  
 
T1.1: “I would rely on it 100%”   
T1.2:“It’s the same for TCAS, same for EGPWS”   
T1.3: “If the thing said stop, I'd stop!” 
 
However, age group and experience can be 
expected to have a potential impact on crew 
acceptability of and dependency on the new 
surveillance equipment and directive alerting. It 
is well known that more experienced pilots tend 
to be less accepting of new technology in the 
cockpit. Age group also appears to have an 
effect on the crew disposition to abort a run late 
in take-off, where senior pilots tend to be more 
reluctant to abort at high speeds than their 
younger counterparts, for fear of overrun. This 
tendency expresses itself in a lowering of the 
effective decision point to a few knots before 
V1. Although this observation was not made in 
the context of runway collisions, its discussion 
is relevant in the present context because crews 
can be expected to relate the concept of decision 
speeds and scheduled performance with conflict 
mitigation, even though this would be incorrect 
as, from a performance perspective, the problem 
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is substantially different. If this is the case, then 
more senior pilots may be expected to be more 
reluctant to follow a stop alert close to V1. A 
similar effect can be expected during landing, 
particularly in good visibility where the crews 
will have visual contact with the conflict. In 
such cases, the more senior pilots may be more 
inclined to ignore or override the alert in certain 
circumstances than younger pilots who will 
have less flying experience.  
 
The responses given by the pilots during the 
evaluation appear to indicate that age does 
indeed influence disposition to blindly accept 
the directive alerts, but not to the extent of 
senior crew being averse to it or considering it 
inappropriate. All junior pilots appeared to be 
well disposed to blindly accepting and 
following the alerts. In comparison, the senior 
pilots were, whilst quite comfortable to follow 
the alert in situations where they perceived they 
had limited situational awareness (typically in 
low visibility), more inclined to overriding it 
when they considered the alert appropriate. This 
mainly referred to approaches in good visibility, 
where the pilots felt that, through their 
situational awareness and discretion, they could 
avoid unnecessary missed approaches. Indeed, 
the senior pilot who was most in favour of alert 
override in Scenario 13 (Trial 7), immediately 
aborted the take-off run close to V1 in Scenario 
7, despite the tendency for more senior pilots to 
be reluctant to abort at high speed.  
 
The suggestion that pilots should have the 
authority to physically suppress or inhibit the 
alert despite following it in perceived difficult 
situations is interesting because, whilst it 
exhibits a level of scepticism expected in senior 
pilots, it effectively also strengthens the view 
that the directive alerting concept is indeed 
acceptable. The suggestion for overriding the 
alert here does not imply mistrust in the system 
but, rather, an acceptance of the alerts and a 
suggestion for pilot discretion to coexist with 
the system. This concept can be considered 
advantageous as it can reduce the impact of 
false warnings and, with pilot decision in the 
loop, could contribute to lower effective 
unnecessary aborts. Indeed, putting the pilot in 
the decision loop, where the human response is 
modulated by situational awareness, can 
significantly contribute towards the mitigation 
of any reduction in safety levels that may be 
inadvertently introduced by safety-net functions 
and Level-3 alerts through false or incorrect 
alerting. 
 
The concept of authority to override, however, 
is delicate in nature because, whereas the 
suggestion of overriding the alert may appear 
reasonable in the context of well trained, 
proficient senior captains, the notion of 
authority to disregard a Level-3 alert is 
debatable, particularly in the context that such 
an alert needs to operate with the whole pilot 
population in different circumstances, and 
different operator cultures. 
  
It is interesting to note that pilots approaching 
middle age, being experienced captains but not 
yet holding senior positions tended not to feel 
the need to have the authority of override the 
alert, exhibiting a tendency similar to that of 
junior pilots. This is perhaps understandable in 
the light that this generation of pilots will likely 
have had more exposure to computer 
technology in their upbringing then those who 
are senior captains today. Furthermore, it can 
also be expected that as one gains more 
experience in life, one would be more aware of 
the limitations of technology and its 
implications. If this is so, it appears that this 
category of pilots are still confident in 
automation and technology whilst being very 
aware of the infrastructure and procedural 
limitations in operation from experience 
gathered throughout their career. Indeed, typical 
comments by experienced pilots were: 
 
T1.4: “If you have a situation where it's telling you to go-
around for example, ATC may tell you clear to land, then 
you say no I'm going around... ATC might have made a 
mistake” 
T1.5: “I would rather trust a fresh computer than a busy 
controller” 
 
In terms of the value perceived by the applicants 
of the system in different visibility conditions, 
many participants felt that the directive alerts 
were useful in both good and poor visibility. In 
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poor visibility, the advantages of the alerting 
system are obvious, as the crew would 
otherwise be unaware of the conflicting aircraft. 
In good visibility, the alerting system was also 
considered of value, with several crews voicing 
the opinion that they would still follow it (T1.6) 
and that in certain airfields where runway 
topography obscured views (such as undulated 
or crossed runways with obstacles such as 
buildings in between), the conflict aircraft may 
still not be visible (T1.7-T1.8). Operation at 
night may also offer significant challenges, as 
aircraft can be missed in the multitude of 
lighting normally associated with busy airports. 
Besides these circumstances, pilots considered 
the warning system of value even when they 
will be in visual contact with the conflict 
aircraft. However, not all crews were in 
agreement with the notion of blindly obeying 
the alert in good visibility conditions, with 
several suggesting that they should have the 
authority to overrule the alert in situations 
where they are sure that the threat is not 
sufficiently serious to warrant following the 
alert (T1.9).    
 
T1.6: “I would still want it, even when it's CAVOK” 
T1.7: “The system is very handy both in low vis but even 
in VMC conditions especially where parts of the runway 
are hidden due to slopes etc.” 
T1.8: “In good visibility the warning system becomes a 
back up system. You are not going to see a light aircraft 
in the middle of the runway. There are some runways 
because of the topography you can't see the other side, 
like Manchester or Leeds” 
T1.9: “Excellent, especially in IMC conditions. In VMC 
however, I would incline to let the pilot decide if the 
warning is appropriate. For example the ‘go-around, 
traffic’ could be triggered unnecessarily if visual 
separation is maintained.” 
 
The merit of needing to override the alert in 
VMC is linked with the selection of thresholds. 
It is relevant to point out here that since the 
system does not differentiate between good and 
poor visibility conditions, thresholds need to be 
set conservatively to safeguard low visibility 
operations. It is understandable that this may 
lead to undesirable go-around alerts on 
approach (this will not happen in take-off) and 
in this context the view expressed in T1.9 is 
understandable. However, from a design 
perspective, it can be argued that, with correctly 
set thresholds, pilots would be exceeding limits 
of predefined safety when knowingly pushing 
limits. Of course, through visual contact, the 
safety limits are conceptually restored but 
whether this practice will be acceptable to the 
industry or otherwise is a matter of debate. The 
challenge that needs to be met is perhaps best 
captured by: 
 
T1.10: “I think that the most important thing is that the 
system gives enough time to react but is not too sensitive 
otherwise the use of the system in busy airports will be 
filtered... ignored... switched off by users!” 
 
It is reasonable to conclude from the discussion 
that no concern on the directive concept was 
voiced and that the alerting concept proposed in 
this work, therefore, should be very acceptable 
on the flight deck. The question of authority to 
override the alert in certain conditions has been 
voiced, but allowing crews to exercise 
discretion may be counter-productive in the 
global context and will need to be addressed 
further. 
 
The discussion up to this point has effectively 
addressed the appropriateness of directive 
alerting concept. It is relevant to also address 
the individual attributes of the design of the 
alerting philosophy, namely:  
• The appropriateness of the phraseology as 
an indicative, but not necessarily final, 
solution. 
• The value of the distance call-outs. 
• Suppression of the alert beyond V1. 
• Remaining silent when the solution to the 
conflict is to continue the manoeuvre. 
• The alerting strategy during 
taxi/backtrack/line-up.  
 
The effectiveness and appropriateness of the 
phraseology used for the alerts in terms of 
wording and duration is of interest because, in 
the design, a compromise was sought between 
length of the selected phrase and detail intended 
to be conveyed in the message. The chosen 
alert, therefore, was expected to have a potential 
impact on crew perception of the threat and 
reaction times. All of the participants were of 
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the opinion that the alerts and phraseology used 
(‘STOP TRAFFIC’ and ‘GO-AROUND 
TRAFFIC’) are in line with what they are used 
to in the cockpit (in particular, through the 
mandatory presence of TCAS and EGPWS). 
They are effective and no evidence of 
distraction from or delay in the correct reaction 
required by the crew was noted. Indeed, T1.3 
indicates the general mind-set observed in the 
evaluations in response to the alert ‘STOP 
TRAFFIC’ during take-off. 
 
The distance call-outs during the braking phase 
in an aborted take-off or after landing proved to 
be effective and were perceived of value by the 
crew. Whereas, informally during the briefing 
sessions some pilots had reservations with 
respect to their expected value, once placed in 
the environment of emergency braking in low 
visibility due to a runway conflict, their views 
changed completely. The distance call-outs 
were found to be of great value to all crews 
when not in visual contact with the conflicting 
aircraft, as otherwise they would have had no 
objective indication of where the conflict might 
be. The effectiveness and value of the call-outs 
can perhaps be best portrayed by the occasion 
where, in Scenario 7, one crew elected to veer 
off the runway and onto the grass when it 
became obvious to them that they would not 
stop before hitting the aircraft. They did so just 
before visual contact with the conflicting 
aircraft. Although not tested for, the distance 
call-outs can conceptually also be used to 
reduce braking when the conflict aircraft is far 
away and it is evident that there is ample 
distance to safely bring the aircraft to a halt with 
reduced braking. The concept of reducing 
braking, however, is a matter of discussion, 
since this can be dangerous in conflicts where 
pilots may gain a false sense of security that 
they will stop in time.  
 
Alerts were suppressed at V1 on the basis that 
aborting beyond this point conflicts with current 
practice. Furthermore, there is serious concern 
on the risk of false alarms beyond V1. It was 
therefore decided that no abort should be 
advised after V1. This can be interpreted as the 
system not providing surveillance after V1, 
which is acceptable, as it is quite reasonable to 
expect safety-net functions not to provide 
support in the most challenging of conditions. 
However, on closer analysis one can quickly 
conclude that if a runway conflict were to be 
detected after V1, conflict dynamics will 
probably result in the more appropriate action 
being a CTO. In such events, the no call-out 
strategy in the event of a CTO fits in perfectly 
with the concept of inhibiting alerts at V1. This 
narrows even further the window of conflict 
combinations where the system is unable to 
provide effective support. 
    
Participants expressed concerns regarding the 
appropriateness of the directive mode in the 
high-speed regime of take-off (Scenarios 7 to 
9). Many participants felt that alerts should be 
suppressed prior to V1 (such as V1 - 5s), 
expressing hesitation in aborting the take-off 
just before V1. 
 
T1.11: “V1 is a go-speed not a stop-speed. The pilot at V1 
has already decided to go. The pilots decide not to go at 
V1 minus five seconds approximately.” 
 
This issue highlights the problem of crew 
perception of the definition of V1, which has 
long been identified by the aviation community 
[18]. This probably stems from fear of overrun, 
which is backed by the fact that only gross 
performance is allowed for, statistically 
indicating that there is indeed a 50% chance of 
overrun when aborting at V1. There are also 
other effects, such as uncertainty in braking 
capability and a general lack of experience in 
emergency braking from V1, but perhaps the 
most influential is the fact that the take-off 
distance required (TODR) of two-engined 
aircraft is limited by the one-engine inoperative 
(OEI) case and crew operating in field limited 
conditions will consequently benefit from 
additional margins in the normal (all-engines 
operative (AEO)) manoeuvre. This, coupled 
with their lack of experience in emergency 
braking tends to raise doubts in pilots' minds 
whether they would manage to stop in time on 
the short runway, even though scheduled 
performance would indicate that they are 
operating within regulation. As a result, pilots 
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tend to be reluctant to abort close to V1 and 
there is evidence that there may be 
preconditioning themselves to go a few seconds 
before V1, despite the fact that this will not 
guarantee a successful CTO. As discussed 
earlier, the extent of this limit can be expected 
to worsen with pilot age. The net effect of this 
discussion is the probable translation of this 
informal crew mind-set to the context of the 
alerting system. It is important to emphasize the 
relevance, therefore, of crew training to follow 
the alert irrespective of any preconceived ideas 
if an RTO is advised by the alerting system just 
before V1. This highlights the need of the 
introduction of procedures to cater for the 
alerting system, a subject that is further 
discussed later in this text. Indeed, the ‘go-
minded’ mentality was openly acknowledged by 
the participants: 
 
T1.12: “We are ‘go-minded’. Training should help with 
that.” 
 
The tendency to be reluctant to abort take-offs 
at high speeds was also evidenced by one pilot 
who, despite following the alert to abort at high 
speed, commented: 
  
T1.13: “I think the warning should be inhibited at 100kts 
because if you get the warning, you should keep going. By 
the time you get it, you'd be past it at your speed.” 
 
The alerting system does not take into account 
the possibility of an early rotation in critical 
conflict conditions, where the aircraft in take-off 
could rotate before reaching VR and climb 
above the conflicting aircraft. Early rotation is a 
risky manoeuvre and it is not possible to 
successfully direct, in terms of an optimal flight 
trajectory, the crew to early rotation to ensure 
that the conflicting traffic is missed whilst not 
jeopardising the safe continuation of the flight. 
Likewise, other unconventional manoeuvres, 
such as increasing thrust when the take-off is 
being attempted at a derated setting1 are not 
considered by the alerting system for reliability 
                                                
1 Take-off is typically performed using derated thrust (for 
fuel efficiency, reduced wear and tear and noise 
abatement) allowing the crew an additional amount of 
power which could be applied in such a situation to rotate 
earlier. 
reasons. In these circumstances it is reasonable 
to rely on visual contact in conjunction with 
crew's discretion in the manoeuvre of choice 
with the alerting system not providing support.  
 
The issue of the system remaining silent in the 
CTO case was raised by participants during the 
discussions. This was because whilst the merits 
of remaining silent can be appreciated as 
previously described, generating no alert, 
particularly in good visual conditions, could be 
perceived by pilots as a system failure, with the 
possibility that they would attempt to abort the 
run on their own initiative. This eventuality, of 
course, would not be desirable. The merit, 
therefore, was to consider whether it would be 
preferable to issue an alert such as ‘CONTINUE 
TRAFFIC’ in the case of a CTO. Whilst the 
advantage in good visual conditions is obvious, 
it is possible that in low visibility, where a 
conflict alert would surprise the crew, such an 
alert could be counter-productive. Here 
dichotomous views where recorded: 
  
T1.14: “Being quiet maintains the ‘status-quo’, you're 
going to continue doing what you're doing.” 
T1.15: “You need something to tell you that the system is 
actually working. So you don't think that it didn't give you 
the alert because the system isn't working!” 
 
Fifteen trials using Scenario 8 were held to 
simulate the marginal CTO case in a runway 
conflict in good visibility conditions, where 
usually, the impression could favour the crew to 
stop. Accordingly this scenario involved the 
conflict aircraft failing to stop at the hold-short 
bar whilst taxiing and approaching the runway 
shoulder as the ownship accelerated towards V1. 
All participants correctly continued the take-off 
and successfully cleared the conflict. From the 
20 participants, 15 were satisfied with the alert 
being suppressed, as they felt it would be 
congruent with the ‘Dark-and-Silent’ cockpit 
philosophy (T1.12, T1.14). Five participants felt 
that seeing an aircraft approaching the runway 
instilled in them the desire to stop, despite still 
following the SOPs and continued the run. 
These participants felt that the system should 
not remain quiet and should instead inform the 
crew of the incursion through some form of 
advisory (T1.15), even if only to provide 
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additional confidence that the alerting system 
has not malfunctioned.  
 
To conclude the discussion of the effectiveness 
of the directive alert concept it is appropriate to 
analyse the quantitative data recorded on the 
simulator. A total of 123 trials were conducted 
with the directive alert (HMI Modes 1 and 2), 
with 66 being conducted in the various take-off 
scenarios and 57 during landing. Of these, pilots 
reacted as intended by the system and 
successfully avoided the collision as desired in 
122 of the occasions, with only one event being 
recorded where the pilot contradicted the 
alerting philosophy. This occurred in Scenario 
9, where the pilot flying saw the conflicting 
aircraft and decided to stop when the system 
remained silent because the preferred decision 
was to continue. In this case the crew took a 
high-speed lateral manoeuvre to avoid the 
collision, which highlights the correct operation 
of the prediction algorithm design. However it 
also highlights the difficulty with the concept of 
remaining silent as, in this case, the pilot must 
have, possibly through fear of collision, 
concluded that a collision must have been 
imminent and that the system had failed. This is 
understandable because it is known that the 
human brain can make erroneous deductions 
under stressful conditions. It would not be 
unreasonable to conclude that a confirmation to 
continue the take-off would have probably led 
the pilot to continue the run. It is also relevant to 
point out that there were nine trials in this 
scenario, with the other eight continuing the run 
as expected and this suggests that the 
probability of doubting the system when 
remaining silent may be low.  
 
Crews who were in favour of following the alert 
under all circumstances also commented that 
such an alerting system needs to be backed-up 
by clear SOPs to strictly dictate that the alert 
should always be followed.  
 
T1.16: “Procedure would dictate that you always obey 
the alert” 
 
The taxi/backtrack/line-up operation is not a 
core feature of the system but was introduced to 
provide a complete solution on the runway. In 
such conditions the design proposed informative 
alerts because there were few options 
considered conventional that could be taken by 
the ownship in these contexts. The scope of the 
evaluation was to consider difficult scenarios 
that could highlight whether the author's 
concerns in the appropriateness of informative 
alerts were founded or otherwise. To assess this, 
the two scenarios chosen involved the ownship 
closely following another aircraft along the 
runway and an aircraft approaching to land on 
the runway on which the ownship was lining up 
for take-off. As expected, these scenarios raised 
concerns on the clarity of the alert. In the 
situations, such as Scenario 1, where the 
ownship is actively involved in the runway 
conflict by taxiing too close and fast to the 
aircraft ahead, the crew appreciated the alert 
‘WARNING TRAFFIC AHEAD’ and took 
action to reduce their closure rate. The context 
afforded the relatively long aural alert without 
compromising timeliness in reaction. However, 
in Scenario 2, with the alert ‘CAUTION 
TRAFFIC BEHIND’, crews raised concern 
there was little action they could take. This was 
not unexpected as in such situations, action by 
the other party is normally required to mitigate 
the conflict. In addition to this, the alert raised 
concerns with the participants, as they felt that 
the aural alert alone provided insufficient 
information as to exactly where and what 
manoeuvre, if any, the conflicting aircraft was 
performing (T1.17-T1.19). Participants 
commented that the alert itself does not indicate 
whether another aircraft is taxiing, taking off or 
landing behind them. It was generally felt that 
the aural alerts alone where inadequate. This 
again was expected and confirms that advising 
pilots of a threat without supporting them 
further towards taking mitigating action is 
ineffective.  
 
T1.17: “The problem is this: the aural warning doesn't 
tell you if someone is lining up behind you or somebody 
on the approach” 
T1.18: “Is it four miles behind me, one mile behind me, I 
only know that it is just behind” 
T1.19: “If you're not aware that there is somebody on the 
approach, the first reaction is to look at each other and 
say ‘what’?” 
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This clearly indicates the value of the display in 
such circumstances. The use of the display is 
also reasonable because crew workload during 
taxi/backtrack/line-up will not be high as in 
take-off and landing. Use of a moving-map 
display is, therefore, recommended for such 
manoeuvres. It is interesting, however, to note 
that several pilots commented that the aural alert 
alone (when not presented with the display in 
HMI Mode 1) was adequate because it 
prompted them to contact ATC (T1.20). Two 
participants attempted to vacate the runway 
from the closest taxiway. There were, however, 
concerns on the possibility of nuisance warnings 
caused in busy airfields. Whilst the crew felt 
that a minimum of 30s warning is adequate to 
avoid nuisance alerts, they still felt that, within 
this short time, it is not always possible for them 
to vacate the runway, particularly when the next 
exit taxiway is far from the threshold (T1.21). In 
such circumstances, participants commented 
that they would hesitate to take a lateral 
manoeuvre off the paved runway surface, as this 
is risky, and would prefer contacting ATC to 
instruct the other aircraft on the approach to go-
around.  
 
T1.20: “It was good because it prompted me to ask ATC” 
T1.21: “What can you do, it's too late. The most you can 
do is to tell ATC and he might tell the other guy to go-
around. The engines take too long to spool up”  
 
This discussion suggests that an informative 
alert needs to be generated with sufficient time 
for crews to react either by contacting ATC or 
confirming the conflict with the moving-map 
beforehand, if available. A late warning would 
limit its value and the solution needs to be a 
compromise with the risk of generating 
unnecessary alerts. It should be considered, 
however, that nuisance advisory alerts in this 
context will have less of an impact on safety, 
operations and general acceptance than those 
generated by the directive contexts of take-off 
and landing.  
3.5.2. Objective 3  
Objective 3 was concerned with the value of the 
preceding auditory tone and the use of a 
graphical display. The literature [19-20] advises 
that verbal alerts issued in a noisy environment 
and when the crew are under high workload 
should be preceded by an attention grabbing 
auditory tone. Consequently, the verbal alerts 
were preceded by an introductory (whoop-
whoop) tone. However, an introductory tone 
introduces an additional delay, which is not 
advantageous in the context of emergency 
alerting when the alert cannot be generated 
earlier to compensate for this delay. In general, 
crews can either be expected to wait for the 
completion of the tone and the alert to react, or 
else, react immediately on hearing of the tone. If 
they react on the tone alone before the verbal 
alert is issued, then they would be latching on 
the tone itself as the alert. This is not the 
intention of this tone, also because unless a 
unique tone is used, confusion on the meaning 
of the tone can result1. Furthermore, there is a 
limited number of specific tones that crews can 
be expected to memorise on the flight deck and, 
considering that a runway incursion alert is 
expected to be a rare event, it is quite possible, 
in this circumstance, that a specific tone could 
surprise or confuse the crew rather than lead 
them to immediate, correct action. It is for this 
reason that the merits of the preceding tone 
were considered through simulator evaluation. 
Both qualitative data in terms of participant 
opinion and quantitative data in terms of 
reaction times were used in this consideration.   
 
The data collected gave no evidence that the 
preceding tone had any significant effect 
towards directing pilots to abort the manoeuvre 
and it can be concluded that the verbal alert on 
its own is sufficient. As shown in Table 1, 76 
trials included the introductory tone (Mode 1) 
and 63 trials were conducted without the tone 
(Mode 2). All participants of the 76 trials 
commented that the tone (which was 1.22s long 
and followed by a 0.15s pause before the verbal 
alert) was too long. This delay was considered 
particularly significant during the medium and 
                                                
1 A specific case where a tone was misidentified was that 
of the Helios accident in 2005, where the aircraft involved 
used the same tone for take-off configuration warning and 
loss of cabin pressure. As the aircraft climbed through 
12,000ft the cabin pressure warning horn sounded and the 
crew misidentified it as a take-off configuration warning. 
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high-speed take-off scenarios, where every 
second can affect the outcome of the situation.  
 
T3.1: “It was taking too long to get the actual message” 
T3.2: “The ‘whoop-whoop’ causes a delay of about two 
seconds. Not happy with this.” 
 
One of the comments (T3.3) actually confirmed 
that at least some pilots were waiting for the 
verbal alert following the preceding tone, as 
intended by design: 
 
T3.3: “In the ‘whoop-whoop’ phase you're still confused. 
‘Whoop-whoop’ what? It's not just let's try out a rejected 
take-off and see what happens. You have to be 100% sure 
what's the warning” 
   
The question, therefore, is whether crews would 
prefer the inclusion of the tone or otherwise. 
Their reaction to the tone suggested eliminating 
it altogether: 
 
T3.4: “I feel the initial `whoop-whoop' is not needed” 
T3.5: “I don't see the need for a horn, it wastes time” 
 
In this discussion, however, one must keep in 
mind the fact that the participants where in a 
simulated environment with the sole purpose of 
evaluating a runway collision avoidance 
function. This will surely have somewhat biased 
the arguments, because the simulated 
environment is quieter and more relaxed than 
can be expected in normal operations and 
participants would be preconditioned to expect a 
runway conflict and associated alert. 
 
With the response indicating a preference for 
the tone removal, quantitative data in terms of 
response times to alerts with and without the 
preceding tone were assessed and are presented 
in Table 1. Whilst the details of the merits of 
these statistics are discussed further in this text, 
it is here appropriate to extract key inferences 
with respect to the discussion of the value of the 
preceding tone.  
 
The removal of the preceding tone reduced the 
average response time by 0.8s during take-off 
and 0.3s during landing. Besides the fact that 
the landing results may be conditioned by the 
availability of the moving-map in some of the 
trials, it is reasonable to focus on the reduction 
in response time during take-off particularly 
because it is envisaged that conflicts in take-off 
will be more likely to require immediate 
reaction when compared to conflicts 
experienced on the approach.  The reduction in 
response time of 1.37s due to the removal of the 
preceding tone led to a 0.8s reduction in average 
response time during take-off. This suggests that 
the preceding tone partially conditioned crews' 
reaction to the extent of reducing the effect of 
the delay in reacting to the verbal alert by 
approximately 0.6s. Nevertheless, the overall 
additional delay of 0.8s is considered more of a 
disadvantage, as it brings the crew's closer to, or 
possibly exceed, the TTLR point. A reduction in 
standard deviation in reaction time in take-off is 
also noted in Table 1. Although the reason for 
this cannot be ascertained, it is possible that the 
tone chosen may have startled the crew, which 
would understandably result in a larger spread 
in reaction time when compared to that without 
such a tone. 
 
Table 1 - Statistics for crew reaction time in HMI Modes 
1 and 2. 
 
 
It can, therefore, be concluded from this 
analysis that the removal of the preceding tone 
would be advantageous as it will contribute to 
reduce the reaction time in take-off at the 
expense of the unlikely event of crews missing 
the alert. If this risk is considered too high then 
a compromise can be found, whereby the tone is 
placed after the verbal alert preceding the 
repetition. This may be a solution that mitigates 
the risk of missing the alert, without 
compromising the reaction times.  
 
Objective 3 also involved with assessment of 
the value of graphical displays to augment the 
aural alert. All participants presented with a 
textual alert on the primary flight display (Mode 
2, 63 trials) agreed that the graphical alert was 
8.6 Results and Analysis
T3.4 “I feel the initial ‘whoop-whoop’ is not needed”
T3.5 “I don’t see the need for a horn, it wastes time”
In this discussion, however, one must keep in mi d t e fact that the participants
where in a simulated environment with the sole purpose of evaluating a runway
collision avoidance function. This will surely have somewhat biased the arguments,
because the simulated environment is quieter and more relaxed than can be expected
in normal operations and participants would be preconditioned to expect a runway
conflict and associated alert.
With the response indicating a preference for the tone removal, quantitative data in
terms of response times to alerts with and without the preceding tone were assessed.
Using the data presented in Appendix H, crew response statistics were calculated
and are presented in Table 8.3. Whilst the details of the merits of these statistics
are discussed in Section 8.6.3.2, it is here appropriate to extract key inferences with
respect to the discussion of the value of the preceding tone.
Mode µ   # of samples
Take-o↵ 1 2.61 0.51 24
2 1.78 0.38 19
Landing 1 2.31 0.57 19
2 2.02 0.86 20
Table 8.3: Statistics for crew reaction time in HMI Modes 1 and 2.
The removal of the preceding tone reduced the average response time by 0.8s during
take-o↵ and 0.3s during landing. Besides the fact that the landing results may
be conditioned by the availability of the moving-map in some of the trials, it is
reasonable to focus on the reduction in response time during take-o↵ particularly
because it is envisaged that conflicts in take-o↵ will be more likely to require
immediate reaction whe compared to conflicts experienced on he approach. The
reduction in response time of 1.37s due to the removal of the preceding tone led to
a 0.8s reduction in average response time during take-o↵. This suggests that the
preceding tone partially conditioned crews’ reaction to the extent of reducing the
e↵ect of the delay in reacting to the verbal alert by approxi ately 0.6s. Nevertheless,
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beneficial and this confirms the value of the 
concept of redundancy gains in the context of 
runway incursion alerting.   
The value of the airport moving-map in runway 
conflict mitigation, however, is debatable. 
Airport moving-maps are already present on the 
flight decks and will most certainly become 
available on all commercial aircraft in the 
future. It is perhaps obvious to deduce that it 
will also be useful during taxi, back-track and 
line-up on the runway, as evidenced by 
transcripts T3.6-T3.7: 
 
T3.6: “The map is very, very useful, ignore the idea of 
traffic, just taxiing around is very useful... something 
essential I think, once you experience it, you don't want to 
stop using it” 
T3.7: “Another big plus which we didn't really do today 
is taxi out in poor visibility for places like Charles De 
Gaulle, these places with complicated taxi routes” 
 
The question, therefore, is whether the use of an 
airport moving-map would be advantageous in 
conflict resolution during take-off and landing, 
when the crew will be concentrating on other 
tasks and reaction times may be low. All 
participants considered this not to be the case 
during take-off, with a few having strong views 
against its use.   
 
T3.8: “The aural alert is far more useful than a detailed 
map of the runway and the apron and the terminal 
buildings, which although is very pretty and good for 
taxiing out, it is not a mode I would choose for take-off” 
T3.9: “If you get the auto-call to tell you to stop, you 
don't need the map” 
T3.10: “There is no need to have it on display. You just 
need to hear something, stop/go/whatever, you won't be 
looking inside to see it” 
T3.11: “In take-off if it says stop, I would stop because I 
heard the command and not because I made use of the 
display”   
T3.12:  “If something taxis onto that runway, no amount 
of maps, displays, pictures or photographs is going to 
change the fact that it is on the runway and you have to 
stop” 
 
This confirmed the intentions of the design, 
where, at the conceptual design phase, it was 
considered that there would be no value for 
crews to confirm a stop command via an airport 
moving-map during take-off. Not only would 
this distract from the authority (and intention) of 
the alert, but referring to the display would 
result in a further delay in response and a risk of 
potential replacement of objective assessment 
(by the system) with subjective interpretations 
of the conflict conditions deduced from the 
moving-map. This view is further confirmed by 
T3.13: 
  
T3.13: “In take-off it doesn't help, you definitely not 
going to look at the map. We're looking at other things, 
we don't have time, you're looking at the engines, looking 
at the speed, we have call-outs to do” 
  
The comment of other responsibilities and, 
specifically, that referring to call-outs is 
interesting. On one occasion in Scenario 9, the 
pilot not flying fixated on the conflict aircraft on 
the display and missed the rotation speed, 
calling for rotation 3s late. Besides the intrinsic 
concerns associated with late rotation, this delay 
actually brought the two aircraft in conflict 
closer together and resulted in a higher risk of 
collision.     
 
T3.14: “Having that information displayed on the map 
caused me to fixate on that display and as a result, I was 
late in giving the VR rotate command which oddly enough 
could have caused us to hit that aircraft” 
 
Whereas it can be expected that an airport 
moving-map display could provide situational 
awareness prior to the dynamics resulting in a 
conflict (and the issuing of an alert), its 
availability can also act as a serious distraction, 
not least when considering that an airport 
moving-map display is comparatively complex 
and highly dynamic. It will therefore require 
more attention to extract the relevant 
information from it than, for example, that 
required when reading an engine instrument, 
where gauges are designed to allow quick 
observation of multiple instruments through the 
interpretation of relative needle position and 
colour coding. The effects of the complexity of 
the airport moving-map can be expected to have 
greatest impact on operations particularly in the 
early stages of system availability: 
  
T3.15: “I am pretty sure that the system [moving 
map] will initially result in quite a few unnecessary 
aborted take-offs... If I have new stuff on my screen, 
I have to do something about it, especially in low 
visibility” 
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The value of knowing the relative position of 
the conflict aircraft to that of the ownship has 
already been highlighted through the concept of 
distance call-outs. It was therefore of interest to 
determine whether the airport moving-map 
would be useful for such information. One pilot 
was specifically asked the question, to which he 
replied:  
 
T3.16: “Personally I didn't need to look at the display. 
The distance call-outs were less intrusive”  
  
Furthermore it should be noted that the pilot 
flying should be looking out in such 
circumstances and there will be little value in 
the pilot not flying focussing his attention on a 
display to carry out a call-out function that can 
be automated through the distance call-out 
alerts.   
  
All participants considered the map as an 
ineffective tool during landing. This could 
possibly have been due to the limitation of the 
implementation of the map, which only allowed 
the view of a fixed 800m range ahead of the 
ownship and therefore did not allow the full 
view of the runway for traffic monitoring. 
Despite this limitation, participants felt that the 
directive alert alone was sufficient as it led to 
the correct action.  
 
T3.17: “I don't think you need it in flight” 
T3.18: “If it [the system] will give you a warning that 
there is traffic, you do not care if it is at the first 
intersection or second intersection, you go-around 
anyway.” 
T3.19: “In these cases the display is not very useful, it is 
more the aural alert we are reacting to” 
 
Two participants commented that once the go-
around had been initiated, they made use of the 
display to confirm the threat on the runway. 
They did not, however, use the display as a 
means of conflict detection or mitigation.  
 
T3.20: “After the go-around I looked at it” 
3.5.3. Objective 4 
Having established that directive alerting of 
runway conflicts will be acceptable on the flight 
deck, it was interesting to assess whether this 
strategy would be preferred over non-directive 
(informative) alerts informing of the presence of 
a conflict. This is because, seen in isolation, 
either system would be expected to foster 
positive response in trials, as both would be 
perceived as introducing an improvement in the 
safety levels achieved in current operation. 
However, it is important to attempt to select the 
better of the two strategies when considering 
implementation. Clearly, the algorithms 
associated with the non-directive alerting will 
be simpler, as no conflict resolution guidance 
would need to be provided. Crews would 
instead need to rely on an airport moving-map 
to identify the threat, as would be expected with 
technologies developed to date. 
 
In order to be able to compare the two alerting 
strategies, two sets of trials were carried out. In 
the first, crews were exposed to and underwent 
trials with the directive alerting, followed by a 
further briefing and a set of trials with non-
directive alerting. The second set had the 
sequence reversed with crews first being 
exposed only to and undergoing trials with the 
non-directive alerting, followed by briefing and 
trials with the directive alerting. This ensured 
that there would be no bias due to 
preconditioning in the results. In these 
experiments, Modes 2 and 3 were used and 
therefore both the directive alert set-up and the 
non-directive counterpart had the same airport 
moving-map available. The non-directive alerts 
where generated with the same algorithm, with 
the conflict mitigation and alert suppression 
algorithms disabled, so that the alert 
‘RUNWAY INCURSION’ was generated for 
every conflict detected, leaving the crew to 
decide what action to take.  
Seventy-two trials where carried out in this 
experiment using four sets of crews, equally 
split between the two sets. The two crews that 
experienced the non-directive alerting strategy 
first liked it, but on carrying out the trials with 
the directive alert immediately preferred the 
latter technique. The crews that ran the process 
in reverse disliked the non-directive alert, 
having seen the directive alerting beforehand. 
This outcome is very indicative that the 
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directive alerting approach is superior to 
informative alerting in the context of runway 
conflict alerting during take-off and landing. 
However, the finer merits of the views 
expressed by the participants should also be 
addressed.   
   
A concern that was voiced by participants was 
that non-directive alerting required them to 
correctly identify the conflict dynamics from the 
airport moving-map and external cues and to 
then decide on the action to take, clearly 
requiring significant mental processing. Indeed, 
the scope of the directive alerting is to reduce 
the mental process to a simple reaction and this 
is a view endorsed by the participants in T4.1: 
 
T4.1: “The directive would be the only one I could live 
with. The informative just takes too much time to take the 
information in, process it and decide what you are going 
to do. By which time you have missed other things...” 
 
Indeed, in one particular instance on the 
approach (Scenario 13, with an aircraft aborting 
a take-off ahead on the runway), when the 
‘RUNWAY INCURSION’ alert was sounded, 
the crew did not execute a missed approach. 
They continued to land despite being 
intentionally1 not cleared to do so. Although the 
scenario did not result in a collision, the safety 
margins associated with the landing manoeuvre 
were seriously compromised. During the 
ensuing discussions, the crew admitted that 
from the moment the alert was issued until 
touchdown they were attempting to decide 
whether to perform a go-around or to land and 
apply full braking by following the airport 
moving-map. This additional workload caused 
the crew to miss the fact that they were not 
cleared to land (T4.7-T4.8). When the same 
scenario was exercised with the directive alerts, 
the same crew reacted immediately without 
having to take the decision on whether or not to 
perform the go-around. 
   
T4.7: “We are making the mistake of [being] the thinker 
and not the reactor.” 
                                                
1 The pseudo ATCO intentionally did not clear the 
aircraft to land during the scenario, when he realised that 
the crew continued with the approach. 
T4.8: “Once you start thinking about it, then OK, I am 
weighting up the odds and trying to make a decision, 
there is the chance you make the wrong decision... and 
this is why SOPs are written. Once you hear the call you 
react immediately.” 
 
All the participants were of the opinion that the 
directive mode of alerting is more compelling 
during landing and they would feel more 
inclined to following the alert immediately.  
 
T4.9: “If it tells you ‘GO-AROUND’, I would be more 
inclined to doing it” 
 
More seriously, participants elected for the 
manoeuvre that would not have been preferred 
by the system in six of the 17 take-off trials with 
non-directive alerting. This indicates a high 
probability of crews taking sub-optimal or 
inappropriate manoeuvres when only 
informative alerting is available. In the high 
speed conflict scenario (Scenario 7 in take-off, 
preferred manoeuvre to abort), two out of three 
elected to continue rather than abort. One of 
these hit the conflicting aircraft at high speed. In 
comparison, all ten trials of Scenario 7 using the 
directive alerting were completed with the 
preferred manoeuvre, all of which were 
successful. In Scenario 8, where the conflict 
dynamics, in good visibility, warranted 
continuing the take-off to pass the other aircraft 
before it actually entered the runway, the 
statistics were even worse. Four out of the five 
trials using informative alerting resulted in 
collisions following rejection of the run. Only 
one participant elected to continue and 
successfully avoided the conflict. In comparison 
11 trials in this scenario were carried out using 
directive alerting, all of which were completed 
successfully.   
 
The results of Scenario 8 are perhaps very 
indicative of the limitations of the informative 
alerting technique. With the conflict occurring 
at high speed and in good visibility, the 
‘RUNWAY INCURSION’ alert may have 
preconditioned pilots to misjudge the conflict 
conditions, for it is natural to attempt to stop if 
one sees an aircraft approaching the runway. 
Crews were of the opinion that in such 
conditions, hearing the informative alert 
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supported by the visual cues of an aircraft 
approaching the runway could cause them to 
take an instinctive reaction to stop.  
 
T4.10: “May prompt a rejected take-off because you 
think you have more time” 
T4.11: “Just to hear something may trigger a reaction” 
T4.12: “RUNWAY INCURSION at this stage would 
probably panic you” 
 
In contrast, in Scenario 7, which warranted the 
aircraft stopping from high speed (>100kts) in 
low visibility, participants indicated that, in the 
absence of directive alerting, they felt more 
confident in continuing the run and climb over 
the conflict, as they found it very difficult to 
judge the distance required to stop: 
 
T4.13: “It is very difficult to judge whether you will stop 
or not and its very difficult to gauge distance [from the 
display]” 
 
Whilst this comment is valid for all scenarios 
and particularly those in take-off, the non-
assertiveness of the informative alert reinforces 
the argument that, due to the fact that the crew 
are `go-minded' at high speed (typically above 
100kts), an alert which does not specifically 
indicate what action should be conducted, could 
lead to the crew to taking the incorrect decision. 
All participants who experienced the system 
with non-directive alerts were of the opinion 
that these must be supported with an airport 
moving-map, particularly in low visibility take-
off conflicts. In these cases, the crew have 
otherwise no means of knowing where the 
conflicting aircraft is positioned and therefore 
cannot take an informed decision on whether to 
stop or continue the run. 
 
T4.14: “During the roll phase you want the function for 
the ground traffic information and for that you need some 
sort of map. One can't function without the other... how 
will you know where it [the conflicting aircraft] is?” 
 
However, during low visibility landing, the 
participants were of the opinion that once a 
runway incursion alert is generated, an 
immediate go-around should be performed and 
the use of the display in this case is, therefore, 
not required as they would not knowingly 
continue with their descent. 
 
T4.15: “In the take-off in ground phase I really like the 
map, but during an approach and in low vis, then no. 
You're not going to land anyway, you just go-around”  
 
A particular complication with the ‘RUNWAY 
INCURSION’ alert of Mode 3 (as compared to 
‘CAUTION TRAFFIC BEHIND’ in Modes 1 
and 2) is the case during taxi/back-track/line-up, 
where the alert does not advise whether the 
threat is approaching from ahead or behind the 
ownship. In these circumstances, several 
participants commented that the alert alone 
provides no indication on where and what action 
the conflicting aircraft is performing and they 
therefore cannot take any action. In these 
circumstances the crew felt that the alert alone 
provided no additional situational awareness 
and needed to be backed up by the airport 
moving-map.  
 
T4.16: “The call caught me off guard. With `RUNWAY 
INCURSION' I was looking down the runway, never 
assuming something was coming from behind”  
 
Quantitative analysis was performed to provide 
measures of success or failure of the evasive 
manoeuvres conducted during each scenario and 
to perform a comparison of the participant's 
response to the alerts using the different HMI 
modes. This analysis tested for any difference 
between HMI modes, in: 
 
• Conducting the expected evasive 
manoeuvre. 
• Collision rates. 
• Crew reaction. 
Comparison of the Expected Evasive 
Manoeuvre across Modes 
The contingency table of Table 2 shows the 
frequency with which participants conducted the 
expected manoeuvres when provided with alerts 
in the different HMI modes. From this table it is 
evident that approximately 20% of the 
participants conducted an unexpected 
manoeuvre when provided with alerts in Mode 
3, with the deviations occurring mostly (6 out of 
7) in the high speed take-off scenarios (7, 8 and 
9). This statistic is significantly larger when 
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compared to its counterpart for Modes 1 and 2. 
However, this alone provides no insight into 
whether there is an association between crew 
action and the HMI mode, or whether the effect 
is simply due to chance. 
 
Table 2 – Expected action contingency table. 
 
 
A non-parametric test of differences was, 
therefore, conducted to determine whether an 
association indeed exists. The Pearson chi-
square (Χ2) test of hypothesis with a 0.05 level 
of significance1 was selected for the test. 
However, this test does not provide reliable 
results when the expected counts in the 
contingency table are low (with more than 20% 
of the frequencies being below 5). This can be 
corrected for through the application of Yate's 
correction for discontinuity, which however, is 
only possible for 2x2 contingency tables. 
Consequently, Modes 1 and 2 were grouped 
together to form a 2x2 contingency table as 
show in Table 3. Yate's corrected Χ2 was then 
computed2 on this table. This resulted in a Χ2 
statistic of 23 and a significance of p=0.000, 
therefore rejecting the null hypothesis H0 that 
the association between the crew action and 
HMI mode is due to chance. As expected, the 
result indicates that there is a higher probability 
that the crew perform the expected action when 
given directive alerts (Mode 1 and 2) as against 
when given informative alerts (Mode 3). 
Performing the Yate's corrected Χ2 on Mode 1 
and 2 alone gives a statistic of 0.66 with a 
significance of p=0.417. This indicates that the 
difference observed between the expected 
manoeuvres when the crew were presented with 
HMI Modes 1 and 2 is not significant.   
 
                                                
1  This ensures that there is only a 5% chance that the null 
hypothesis is wrongly rejected (Type I Error). 
2 Yate's corrected Χ2 was computed using the statistical 
software SPSS v17. 
Table 3 – Grouped expected action contingency table 
 
 
Comparison of Collision Rates across Modes  
When comparing the relative success of each 
HMI mode, perhaps what is more important 
than determining whether participants 
conducted the expected action is whether a 
collision was avoided or not. In fact, during the 
175 trials, six collisions occurred3, five when 
exercising HMI Mode 3 and one when 
exercising HMI Mode 1. In fact these collisions 
occurred due to an incorrect action taken on 
behalf of the crew in mitigating the conflict 
during Scenarios 7, 8 and 9 (Table 4). During 
Scenario 7, one trial out of the three exercised 
using Mode 3, led into a collision close to 
rotation as the participants decided to continue 
the run, thinking that there was sufficient 
distance remaining. Similarly, out of the five 
trials held using Mode 3 for Scenario 8, four 
participants opted for a rejected take-off with 
three of them not decelerating in time to avoid 
having to take a lateral manoeuvre to avoid a 
medium speed collision. The one participant 
evaluating HMI Mode 1 violated the procedure 
of continuing the run when the system remains 
silent (Scenario 9), performing an abort close to 
V1. In this case the crew veered off the runway 
at 104kts to avoid the collision.      
 
Table 4 - Collision demographics 
 
    
                                                
3 These included the cases where a lateral excursion was 
attempted, as the response would have resulted in a 
collision if this action was not taken at the last moments 
before impact. 
8.6 Results and Analysis
1. Conducting the expected evasive manoeuvre.
2. Collision rates.
3. Crew reaction.
8.6.3.1 Comparison of the Expected Evasive Manoeuvre across Modes
The contingency table of Table 8.4 shows the frequency with which participants
conducted the expected manoeuvres when provided with alerts in the di↵erent HMI
modes. From this table it is evident that approximately 20% of the participants
conducted an unexpected manoeuvre when provided with alerts in Mode 3, with the
deviations occurring mostly (6 out of 7) in the high speed take-o↵ scenarios (7, 8
and 9). This statistic is significantly larger when compared to its counterpart for
Modes 1 and 2. H wever, is alone provides no insigh into whether there is an
association between crew action and the HMI mode, or whether the e↵ect is simply
due to chance.
Mode Expected Action Total
Yes No
1 75 (98.7%) 1 (1.3%) 76 (100%)
2 63 (100%) 0 (0%) 63 (100%)
3 29 (80.6%) 7 (19.4%) 36 (100%)
Total 167 (95.4%) 8 (4.6%) 175 (100%)
Table 8.4: Expected action contingency table.
A non-parametric test of di↵erences was, therefore, conducted to determine whether
an association indeed exists. The Pears n chi-square ( 2) test of hypothesis with
a 0.05 level of significance1 was selected for the test. However, this test does not
provide reliable results when the expected counts in the contingency table are low
(with more than 20% of the frequencies being below 5). This can be corrected
for through the application of Yate’s correction for discontinuity, which however,
is only possible for 2 ⇥ 2 contingency tables. Consequently, Modes 1 and 2 were
1This ensures that there is only a 5% chanc that the null hypothesis is wrongly rejected (Type I
Error).
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grouped together to form a 2 ⇥ 2 contingency table as show in Table 8.5. Yate’s
corrected  2 was then computed1 on this table. This resulted in a  2 statistic of 23
and a significance of p = 0.000, therefore rejecting the null hypothesis H0 that the
association between th crew action and HMI mode is due to chance. As expected,
the result indicates that there is a higher probability that the crew perform the
expected action when given directive alerts (Mode 1 and 2) as against when given
informative alerts (Mode 3). Performing the Yate’s corrected  2 on Mode 1 and 2
alone gives a statistic of 0.66 with a significance of p = 0.417. This indicates that the
di↵erence observed between the expected manoeuvres when the crew were presented
with HMI Modes 1 and 2 is not significant.
Mode Expected Action Total
Yes No
1&2 138 (99.3%) 1 (0.7%) 139 (100%)
3 29 (80.6%) 7 (19.4%) 36 (100%)
Total 167 (95.4%) 8 (4.6%) 175 (100%)
Table 8.5: Grouped expected action contingency table.
8.6.3.2 Comparison of Collision Rates across Modes
When comparing the relative success of each HMI mode, perhaps what is more
important than determining whether participants conducted the expected action is
whether a collision was avoided or not. In fa t, during the 175 trials, six collisions
occurred2, five when exercising HMI Mode 3 and one when exercising HMI Mode
1. In fact these collisions occurred due to an incorrect action taken on behalf of
the crew in mitigating the conflict during Scenarios 7, 8 and 9 (Table 8.6). During
Scenario 7, one trial out of the three exercised using Mode 3, led into a collision
close to rotation as the participants decided to continue the run, thinking that there
1An alternative test is Fisher’s Exact Test, which is, however, only advantageous when Yate’s
corrected  2 p-values re bord rline between significant and non-significant. Yate’s corrected  2
was computed using the statistical software SPSS v17.
2These included the cases where a la ral excursion was attempt d, as the response would have
resul ed in a collision if this action was not taken at the last moments before impact.
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Scenario/Test HMI Expected Conducted Collision or Lateral
Mode Action Action Excursion Velocity (kts)
7/18 3 RTO CTO 146
8/17 3 CTO RTO 53
8/20 3 CTO RTO 53
8/23 3 CTO RTO 26
8/25 3 CTO RTO 59
9/11 1 CTO RTO 104
Table 8.6: Collision demographics.
was su cient distance remaining. Similarly, out of the five trials held using Mode 3
for Scenario 8, four participants opted for a rejected take-o↵ with three of them not
decelerating in time to avoid having to take a lateral manoeuvre to avoid a medium
speed collision. The one participant evaluating HMI Mode 1 violated the procedure
of continuing the run when the RCAF remains silent (Scenario 9), performing an
abort close to V1. In this case the crew veered o↵ the runway at 104kts to avoid the
collision.
The statistics of Table 8.6 indicate that five collisions would have occurred in Mode
3 and one with Mode 1 if lateral manoeuvres where not conducted under the crew’s
initiative. This indicates that the failure rate, in terms of collisions or runway
excursions, was recorded to be 15% for Mode 3 as against 0.8% for Modes 1 and 2.
This suggest that directive alerting contributes significantly towards the outcome of
a conflict when compared to non-directive techniques.
8.6.3.3 Comparison of Crew Reaction Time across Modes
In order to evaluate crew reaction to the various HMI modes, the reaction time was
measured to establish whether there is any significant di↵erence in crew reaction
between the modes. The reaction time was taken as the time from the issue of the
alert until mitigating action was taken. In the case of a RTO, this was taken to
be the time from initiation of the alert until the thrust levers were retarded, whilst
in the case of a missed approach the reaction time was taken to be the time from
initiation of the alert until the thrust levers were advanced to TOGA.
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The statistics of Table 4 indicate that five 
collisions would have occurred in Mode 3 and 
one with Mode 1 if lateral manoeuvres where 
not conducted under the crew's initiative. This 
indicates that the failure rate, in terms of 
collisions or runway excursions, was recorded 
to be 15% for Mode 3 as against 0.8% for 
Modes 1 and 2. This suggests that directive 
alerting contributes significantly towards the 
outcome of a conflict when compared to non-
directive techniques.  
Comparison of Crew Reaction Time across 
Modes  
In order to evaluate crew reaction to the various 
HMI modes, the reaction time was measured to 
establish whether there is any significant 
difference in crew reaction between the modes. 
The reaction time was taken as the time from 
the issue of the alert until mitigating action was 
taken. In the case of a RTO, this was taken to be 
the time from initiation of the alert until the 
thrust levers were retarded, whilst in the case of 
a missed approach the reaction time was taken 
to be the time from initiation of the alert until 
the thrust levers were advanced to TOGA. 
 
The crew reaction time is a metric which can be 
grouped across a family of scenarios, such as 
those in take-off and those in landing. In this 
manner, the number of samples available is 
larger, allowing for more significance in the 
statistical analysis performed. For this analysis, 
Scenarios 3 to 7 where grouped for analysis of 
reaction time during take-off, whilst Scenarios 
10 to 13 were grouped for analysis of reaction 
time during landing. Scenarios 1 and 2 were 
excluded from the analysis as these were only 
designed to obtain qualitative data. Scenarios 8, 
9 and 14 had the alert suppressed in Modes 1 
and 2 and therefore could not allow comparison 
in reaction time. Scenario 15 was not included 
in this analysis. 
 
The data samples for reaction time are 
represented in the box-plot of Figure 2, where 
the central red mark is the median, the edges of 
the box represent the 25th and 75th percentiles 
and the whiskers extend to the most extreme 
data points, with the outliers plotted 
individually. Although, outliers are generally 
the cause of error in data collection or data entry 
and are often discarded, in this case they were 
not. The outliers above the median in the data 
gathered during the trials were actually caused 
by crew intentionally disregarding the alert 
when they were in visual contact with the 
intruder. These were of significance in 
indicating that the crew felt comfortable in 
continuing with the manoeuvre and were 
removed only for the statistical analysis, as they 
would otherwise bias the calculated crew 
reaction times. The single outlier below the 
median in take-off Mode 1 was probably caused 
by the crew being preconditioned to expect the 
alert and was therefore also excluded from the 
statistical analysis of reaction time.  
 
 
 
(a) Take-off 
 
 
 
(b) Landing 
 
Figure 2 - Box-plot of crew reaction time across modes 
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Table 5 shows the mean μ and standard 
deviation σ, corrected for outliers, for the 
reaction time across the HMI modes for take-off 
and landing. The data distributions were tested 
for normality (i.e. exhibiting a Gaussian 
distribution) using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
(K-S) test with a 0.05 level of significance, with 
the null hypothesis signifying that the data are 
normally distributed (and the alternate 
hypothesis signifying that the data are non-
normal). The last column in Table 5 shows the 
p-values for the K-S test. Since these are all 
much greater than 0.05, the null hypothesis is 
accepted, signifying that the data are normally 
distributed. 
Table 5 - Statistics for crew reaction time across modes. 
K-S p-values greater than 0.05 indicate that the data are 
normally distributed. 
 
 
From the statistical data, and particularly from 
the box-plot, there is evidence that the crew 
reaction time experienced during the trials may 
be statistically shown to be dependent of the 
HMI mode. 
 
During take-off, particularly in Modes 1 and 2, 
the reaction time was found to have a low 
standard deviation, resulting in a small spread 
and therefore a correspondingly small box in the 
box-plot. From the box-plot it is also evident 
that the median in Mode 2 is significantly lower 
than that in Mode 1. In contrast, Mode 3 
exhibits a larger spread in the data, which is 
biased towards larger values of reaction time. 
This is indeed confirmed by the K-S p-value, 
where for Mode 3 in take-off, a value of 0.599 
was obtained. This indicates that whilst the data 
are approximately normally distributed, they are 
skewed towards larger reaction times. During 
landing the difference between Modes 1 and 2 is 
not so evident with the boxes in the figure 
occupying a similar region. Mode 2, however, 
still exhibits the lower median of the two. As in 
take-off, Mode 3 in landing exhibits the largest 
median and spread across the three modes. 
 
To verify the inferences suggested by the box-
plot, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
with a 0.05 level of significance was conducted 
across the three modes; the null hypothesis 
signifying that there is no significant difference 
between reaction time across the three modes 
and the alternate hypothesis indicating that the 
difference is significant. The test revealed a 
significant difference between the modes both 
during take-off (F(2,46)=11.80; p=0.000<0.05) 
and landing (F(2,47)=4.90; p=0.012<0.05). 
However, as the ANOVA tests only for the 
presence of a significant difference between the 
three modes, it alone is insufficient to indicate 
where the difference lies between the different 
modes. For this, a post-hoc Tukey Honestly 
Significant Test (HSD) was conducted allowing 
the comparison between pairs of means.  
 
This test confirmed that the difference in 
reaction times observed between Modes 1 and 2 
during take-off (p=0.000<0.05) in Table 5 is 
indeed statistically significant. The reaction 
times to Mode 2 alerts were faster, exhibiting a 
mean difference of 0.83s from those associated 
with Mode 1. This result corroborates with the 
qualitative data obtained from the crews, where 
they voiced concern that the preceding tone 
during take-off introduces an undue delay in 
responding to the alert. However, no 
conclusions can be made on whether the 
significant difference in reaction time is due to 
the removal of the preceding tone or the 
introduction of the graphical display, which also 
has an effect on the overall situational 
awareness (even though crews claimed not to 
have used the display in their decision making 
process). The same test performed for the 
landing trials revealed that the difference in 
reaction times between Mode 1 and Mode 2 
alerts is, in fact, not significant (p=0.461>0.05). 
What is observed is that Mode 2 has a slightly 
lower mean reaction time but a larger standard 
deviation. The difference, however, is also not 
considered significant in terms of impact on 
safety, primarily because go-around alerts in 
landing are not critical in timing down to the 
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Figure 8.5: Box-plot of crew reaction time across modes. Central red mark is the
median, the edges of the box represent the 25th and 75th percentiles and the
whiskers extend to the most extreme data points (excluding the outliers marked as
red crosses).
Mode µ   # of samples K-S p-value
Take-o↵ 1 2.61 0.51 24 0.922
2 1.78 0.38 19 0.787
3 2.33 0.91 7 0.599
Landing 1 2.31 0.57 19 0.965
2 2.02 0.86 20 0.590
3 2.93 0.95 11 0.977
Table 8.7: Statistics for crew reaction time across modes. K-S p-values greater
than 0.05 indicate that the data are normally distributed.
shows the p-values for the K-S test. Since these are all much greater than 0.05, the
null hypothesis is accepted, signifying that the data are normally distributed.
From the statistical ata, and particularly from the box-plot, there is evidence that
the crew reaction time experienced during the trials may be statistically shown to
be dependent of the HMI mode. During take-o↵, particularly in Modes 1 and 2,
the reaction time was found to have a low standard deviation, resulting in a small
spread and therefore a correspondingly small box in the box-plot. From the box-plot
it is also evident that the median in Mode 2 is significantly lower than that in Mode
1. In contrast, Mode 3 exhibits a larger spread in the data which is biased towards
larger values of reaction time. This is indeed confirmed by the K-S p-value, where
for Mode 3 in take-o↵, a value of 0.599 was obtained. This indicates that whilst
272
 25  
RUNWAY CONFLICT ALERTING DURING TAKE-OFF AND LANDING: ADVISORY OR DIRECTIVE? 
  
last seconds to avoid a conflict, as may be the 
case in take-off. From this argument it can be 
concluded that the two modes bear no 
significant impact on performance during 
landing.  
   
Tukey's HSD test performed on Modes 2 and 3 
during take-off revealed that the 0.55s 
difference in reaction times is marginally 
significant (p=0.048<0.05). However, what is 
probably more significant is the large difference 
in standard deviation between the two modes, as 
this suggests that the lack of directiveness in 
Mode 3 will introduce a spread in reaction 
times, which compromises the effectiveness of 
the alert in critical conditions.  
 
In comparison, the test performed on the 
landing cases revealed that the difference 
between the two modes is statistically 
significant (p=0.008<0.05). Although there is no 
clear explanation for this observation, reaction 
times are probably affected by the fact that, 
during landing, runway conflicts tend to be less 
critical in terms of TTLR and this may result in 
a slight hesitation in pilot reaction if an alert is 
not assertive. 
4. Conclusions  
This work has demonstrated that directive 
alerting is a robust approach to mitigating 
runway conflicts, with pilots responding 
positively to the concept. The major findings of 
this work are: 
• Aural directive alerting should be used in 
safety-net functions to mitigate runway 
conflicts.  
• The aural alerts ‘STOP TRAFFIC’ and 
‘GO-AROUND TRAFFIC’ repeated with a 
separation of 2.5s were found to be 
satisfactory. 
• The aural alert should be augmented by a 
textual visual display confirming the alert.  
• An introductory auditory tone is not 
preferred and its insertion before the alert 
repetition may be appropriate if the tone is 
to be retained.  
• If the explicit command to stop or go-around 
are not preferred, then the alerts should be 
designed to be interpreted as instructions to 
stop or go-around and not to simply alert 
pilots of a conflict. 
• Remaining silent in the continued case 
appears satisfactory but introduces the risk 
of being confused with system malfunction.  
• Suppressing alerts at V1 is in line with 
alerting strategies currently employed in the 
cockpit.  
• Distance call-outs to the conflict are very 
useful and should be included. 
• Clear instructions to follow the alert need to 
be enforced through SOPs. Authority to 
delay a go-around in good visual conditions 
where the conflict aircraft is positively 
identified visually may need to be 
considered. 
• Use of the airport moving-map is not 
preferred, although the technology will be 
available on the aircraft.  
• Conflict mitigation during taxi/back-
track/line-up is challenging and needs 
further work to ensure effective alerting.  
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